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Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 801 323-5000 
Facsimile: 801323-9037 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GINA M. ARNOLD, and CHARLIE S. 
ARNOLD, 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
vs. 
DAVID GRIGSBY, M.D.; GARY B. 
WHITE, M.D.; and UINTAH BASIN 
MEDICAL CENTER, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING 
Per Court Order of 2/2/09 
CaseNo.20080255-SC 
Plaintiffs / Appellees Gina and Charlie Arnold hereby submit the following 
supplemental briefing as requested in the Court's order of February 2, 2009. 
INTRODUCTION 
Oral argument on certiorari was held in this case on February 2, 2009. During the 
proceeding, the Court inquired sua sponte about certain language in the out-of-state 
tolling statute, (now codified as) Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-104. As the issue had not 
previously been raised, counsel was limited in her ability to provide a substantive 
response. The Court subsequently issued an Order that stated: 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
MAR 3 1 im 
The parties, in their arguments and briefing, as well as the trial court and 
court of appeals in their decisions in this case, have apparently relied upon the 
presumed applicability of Section 78-12-35 of the Utah Code (recodified as 78B-
2-104) to the limitation expressed in Section 78-14-4 (now 78B-3-404). The 
parties disagree upon the correct interpretation of 78-14-4, and the consequences 
that arise under those differing interpretations when 78-12-35 is considered, but it 
is unclear whether or not they disagree that 78-12-35 is to be considered as 
applicable in the first instance. 
To assist the court in fully evaluating the proper interpretation and 
application of 78-14-4, the parties are requested to submit supplemental briefs on 
the following question: 
In what way, if any, does the language of Section 78-12-35 limit its 
application to the provisions of Section 78-14-4? 
As discussed below, appellees respectfully disagree with the premise that it is 
unclear whether the parties disagree as to the applicability of Section 78-12-35 in the first 
instance. Throughout three and a half years of trial court and appellate briefing, appellant 
Grigsby has raised various arguments as to why he considered Section 78-12-35 
inapplicable, but none of those arguments has ever involved the referenced language of 
Section 78-12-35. Under these circumstances, including the fact that this matter is on 
certiorari, appellees respectfully submit that any new argument by Appellants as to 
inapplicability has long since been waived. {See Point III, infra) 
In response to the Court's request, however, appellees hereby submit the following 
analysis of the referenced language in Section 78-12-35. As set forth below, the history 
and structure of the statute, legislative history of its 1987 amendment, and principles of 
statutory construction all support the conclusion that the out-of-state tolling provision 
applies to all statutes of limitation in Utah, including medical malpractice actions. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE PORTION OF SECTION 78-12-35 APPLICABLE TO A POST-
ACCRUAL DEPARTURE DOES NOT CONTAIN THE REFERENCED 
LANGUAGE. 
As an initial matter, appellees note that Section 78-12-35 contains two independent 
sentences, which by their terms address two materially distinct situations. The first 
sentence addresses situations in which a defendant is out of state when a claim accrues: 
If a cause of action accrues against a person while the person is out of the state, the 
action may be commenced within the term as limited by this chapter after his 
return to the state. 
That did not occur in this case. The second sentence addresses the situation 
presented here, in which a defendant departs the state after a cause of action has accrued. 
The second sentence, unlike the first, does not include the language "as limited by this 
chapter." It says only: "If after a cause of action accrues the person departs from the 
state, the time of his absence is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the 
action." The wording of this sentence is similar to that of other tolling provisions. See, 
e.g., §§ 78B-2-105 (effect of death), 78B-2-106 (effect of death outside the state), 78B-2-
107 (effect of war), etc. By its own terms, therefore, the language referenced in the 
Court's Order is not part of the operative portion of the statute, which is that portion 
applicable to defendants who depart the state after a claim arises.1 
1
 Courts similarly appear to distinguish between the two sentences, focusing on the 
second sentence when a defendant has departed from the state after a cause of action 
accrues. See, e.g., Lund v. Hall, 938 P.2d 285, 286 (Utah 1997); Ankers v. Rodman, 995 
F. Supp. 1329,1331 (D. Utah 1997). 
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In any event, as discussed below, it does not appear that the legislature intended 
even the first sentence to preclude application of the out-of-state tolling provision to 
statutory causes of action. 
II. THE FIRST SENTENCE OF SECTION 78-12-35 [78B-2-104] 
APPLIES TO ALL STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS, INCLUDING 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES. 
Generally, the purpose of statutes of limitation is to "encourage promptness in the 
prosecution of actions and thus avoid the injustice which may result from the prosecution 
of stale claims. Statutes of limitations attempt to protect against the difficulties caused by 
lost evidence, faded memories and disappearing witnesses." Lund v. Hall, 938 P.2d 285, 
291 (Utah 1997). 
The legislature has provided certain exceptions to statutes of limitations that serve 
their own beneficial purposes. One such exception is the tolling of statutes of limitations 
when a defendant departs the state after a cause of action accrues. The purpose of 
Section 78-12-35 [78B-2-104] is to "prevent a defendant from depriving a plaintiff of the 
opportunity of suing him by absenting himself from the state during the period of 
limitation." Snyder v. dune, 15 Utah 2d 254, 390 P.2d 915, 916 (1964). 
In light of the historical backdrop of this statute, the case law, and its purpose, it is 
evident that the 1987 amendments to Section 78, one of which changed the wording in 
the first sentence of Section 78-12-35, were not intended to, and did not, exempt an entire 
field of causes of action from operation of the out-of-state tolling provision. 
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A. Legislative History of Section 78-12-35 f78B-2-1041 supports the 
proposition that "as limited by this chapter" does not limit the applicability 
of that sentence to only those statutes of limitations found in that chapter. 
A similar version of the out-of-state tolling provision has existed in this state since 
at least 1876. In that year, the statute said: 
If, where the cause of action shall accrue against a person, he is out of the 
Territory, the action may be commenced within the term herein limited, after his 
return to the Territory; and if after the cause of action shall have accrued, he depart 
the Territory, the time of his absence shall not be part of the time limited for the 
commencement of the action." 
Compiled Laws of Utah 1876, § 1117. 
At that time, the Compiled Laws of Utah had all the statutes of limitation within 
one title. Compiled Laws of Utah 1876, title XVIII, ch. 1-4. There is thus no question 
that the legislature intended the provision to apply to all causes of action. Over the years, 
the wording changed slightly (e.g., from "Territory" to "state"), but the phrase "herein 
limited" remained. 
Meanwhile, the code expanded (most dramatically with the recodifications of 
1953), and the legislature began placing statutes of limitations in other locations in the 
code. Presently, instead of all statutes of limitations being located in one title, more than 
a dozen titles contain statutes of limitation for civil actions. 
In 1987, Sen. Lyle Hillyard proposed a bill that modified various provisions in 
Title 78. Most of the changes were technical or stylistic, an attempt to modernize the 
code by, for example, replacing archaic "hereins" with plainer language. One of these 
stylistic changes was the replacement of "as limited herein" in the second sentence of 
5 
Section 78-12-35 [78B-2-104] with "as limited by this chapter." Laws of Utah 1987, ch. 
19, §4. 
The present statute reads: 
If a cause of action accrues against a person while the person is out of the state, the 
action may be commenced within the term as limited by this chapter after his 
return to the state. If after a cause of action accrues the person departs from the 
state, the time of his absence is no part of the time limited for the commencement 
of the action. 
As demonstrated by the legislative history of Sen. Hillyard's bill, there was no 
intent to make substantive changes to Title 78 by this change in wording. In floor 
debates, Sen. Hillyard said that the purpose of his bill was three fold: First, to eliminate 
the tolling of statutes of limitation for persons while they are incarcerated; second, to 
redefine insanity so as to toll statutes of limitations based upon mental incompetence; and 
third, to reduce the statute of limitations for civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
from four years to two. See Utah Senate Floor Debate, Jan. 16, 1987 (attached hereto as 
Exhibit A). The same three purposes were stated in the House of Representatives floor 
debate. See Utah House Floor Debate, Jan. 28, 1987 (attached hereto as Exhibit B). 
No mention was made of a sweeping change to eliminate the applicability of the 
longstanding out-of-state tolling provision to an entire class of claims, ie.9 every cause of 
action for which the statute of limitations is stated outside of Title 78. Nor was any 
2
 Another change was to separate the statute into two individual sentences. As stated 
above, appellees do not believe that any substantive changes to Section 78-12-35 were 
intended by the legislation. However, if appellee Grigsby argues that substantive changes 
were so intended, the separation of the statute into two discrete sentences must also be 
deemed substantive. 
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mention made of an intent to exempt medical malpractice claims from the tolling 
provision. Indeed, the only reference to medical malpractice claims in the floor debates 
occurred when Sen. Hillyard affirmatively cited medical malpractice claims to illustrate 
how the discovery rule would work in a civil rights case. See Exhibit A, pp. 4-5, 8.3 
Considering the stated purpose of the amendment as well as the changes made to 
this particular provision, it appears that the changes to Section 78-12-35 [78B-2-104] 
were stylistic, not substantive. For instance, instead of "[i]f when a cause of action 
accrues . . ." as found in the earlier version, the amended statute reads, "[i]f a cause of 
action accrues . . . . " Additionally, instead of "against a person when he is out of the state 
. . ." the amended statute says, "against a person while the person is out of the state " 
(Emphasis added). The change from "herein limited" to "as limited by this chapter" was 
similarly stylistic, especially considering that the name of "this chapter" is "Statutes of 
Limitation." 
3
 [Sen. Hillyard]: "Number one, your statute of limitations does not start to run until you 
either know or should know of your cause of action. I hate to bring in medical 
malpractice because that will get Senator Barlow's attention, but in a medical malpractice 
case, for example, if an instrument is left in your body and you don't know about it, then 
the statute of limitations doesn't run until you either know about that being left in your 
body or have good reason to know. The same thing with a civil rights violation In 
my same medical malpractice case, that's always really been the law, is when you should 
have known." 
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B. Principles of statutory construction further support the conclusion that 
Section 78-12-35 [78B-2-104] applies to medical malpractice cases. 
As the Court of Appeals has noted, the state legislature has made it clear that if it 
wishes to exclude a statute of limitation from the tolling statute, it will do so with "clear, 
explicit language." Bonneville Asphalt v. Labor Comm % 2004 UT App 137, % 8, 91 P.3d 
849, 852 (Utah App. 2004). In this case, there is no "clear, explicit language" that says 
the out-of-state tolling statute does not apply to medical malpractice claims, which would 
have been easy to do. 
Furthermore, a well-accepted maxim of statutory construction is that "expression 
unius est exclusion alterius," the expression of one thing is evidence of the exclusion of 
the other. See, e.g., Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98, f 30, 104 P.3d 1208 
("statutory construction presumes that the expression of one should be interpreted as the 
exclusion of another.") In this case, the state legislature chose to overrule a ruling by this 
Court regarding minors, and to expressly state that the two-year malpractice statute of 
limitations applies without regard for minority or legal disability under nearby Section 
78-12-36 [78B-2-108]. (See merits briefs.) Significantly, the legislature did not take the 
additional (major) step of exempting all tolling provisions. 
Absent explicit language exempting medical malpractice cases from the out-of-
state tolling statute, and in light of the legislature's specific reference to a neighboring 
statute, it is again evident that it was not the intent of the state legislature to exclude 
application of Section 78-12-35 [78B-2-104] to medical malpractice cases. 
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C. The statutes of limitation found outside of Section 78-12 [78B-2] are 
indistinguishable from those within, and no rational basis has been 
demonstrated for treating them differently. 
As mentioned, there are statutes of limitations located throughout the Utah Code. 
There is no reasonable argument why the legislature would intend to exempt these claims 
from tolling when a defendant departs from the state. Statutes of limitations located 
outside of Section 78-12 [78B-2] include, among others: (1) liability to third parties 
under the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act (§32A- 14a-102(7)); (2) deceptive trade 
practices under the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act (§13-11-17; (3) discrimination 
under the Utah Fair Housing Act (§57-21-12); (4) product liability actions under the Utah 
Product Liability Act (§78B-6-706); (5) misappropriation under the Uniform Trade Secret 
Act (§13-24-7); (6) wiretapping under the Interception of Communications Act (§77-23a-
11); (7) private racketeering actions (§76-10-1065); and, of course, medical malpractice. 
There is no indication that the legislature intended, essentially sub silentio, to treat 
defendants in these types of claims more favorably than other defendants. As noted 
above, the purpose of Section 78-12-35 [78B-2-104], is to "prevent a defendant from 
depriving a plaintiff of the opportunity of suing him by absenting himself from the state 
during the period of limitation." Snyder, 390 P.2d at 916. That purpose applies equally to 
statutory claims. 
Put simply, there is no reason to conclude that the legislature intended to permit 
tolling of the statute of limitations in claims for negligence, breach of contract, assault, 
wrongful death, trespass to real property, etc., but not in claims for product liability, 
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medical malpractice, wiretapping, racketeering, etc. The out-of-state tolling provision is, 
as it always has been, intended to apply to statutory causes of action.4 
III. APPELLEE GRIGSBY WAIVED ANY ARGUMENT THAT 
SECTION 78-12-35 [78b-2-104] DOES NOT APPLY TO MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE ACTIONS BECAUSE OF ITS WORDING BY 
FAILING TO RAISE THIS ARGUMENT AT ANY POINT IN THE 
TRIAL COURT OR APPELLATE PROCESS. 
As noted in the introduction, litigation of this single issue has consumed more than 
three and a half years. Grigsby filed his initial motion for summary judgment in 
September 2005. In that motion, Grigsby argued that Section 78-12-35 did not apply to 
medical malpractice claims for various reasons, all of which centered on the language of 
Section 78-14-4. The trial court granted Grigsby's motion based upon the arguments 
raised by the parties. 
The Arnolds sought Rule 54(b) certification from the trial court. The Court of 
Appeals reversed, again based upon the arguments raised by the parties. While Grigsby 
again argued to the Court of Appeals that Section 78-12-35 (the tolling statute) did not 
4
 Appellees note that Section 78-12 [78B-2] does contain language relating to medical 
malpractice. It appears that the section appears to have two types of provisions, 
preliminary and substantive. The preliminary sections include topics such as the effect of 
war (§ 78B-2-107), death (§ 78B-2-105), disability (§ 78B-2-108), injunction (§ 78B-2-
112), etc. The substantive sections include specific statutes of limitations for causes of 
action. Included in the preliminary sections is a provision that provides for a separate trial 
in medical malpractice cases in which the statute of limitation is at issue. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-114. The fact that medical malpractice claims are mentioned in the same chapter 
seems to militate further against a suggestion that the legislature intended to exempt such 
claims from its provisions. 
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apply to Section 78-14-4 (the medical malpractice statute), he did not present other 
arguments for inapplicability, such as the referenced language of Section 78-12-35. 
Grigsby then sought certiorari with this court, presenting the same arguments that 
he had to the trial court and court of appeals. When the petition was granted, Grigsby 
submitted two briefs on the merits to this Court that, again, raised no argument based 
upon the language of Section 78-12-35. 
In sum, Grigsby filed two memoranda in support of his motion for summary 
judgment, filed a brief on the merits with the Court of Appeals, participated in oral 
argument at the Court of Appeals, filed two briefs with this Court in support of his 
petition for certiorari, filed two briefs on the merits with this Court, and participated in 
oral argument before this Court, never once raising an argument based upon the language 
of Section 78-12-35 referenced in this Court's order. 
Although appellees believe that their construction of Section 78-12-35 [78B-2-
104] is correct, as a matter of waiver and basic fairness - to the trial court and Court of 
Appeals, as well as the parties - the Court should not address any contrary argument by 
Grigsby. Apart from avoiding the waste of judicial resources, the doctrine of wavier 
serves many purposes. Parties and their lawyers rely on their opponents' arguments, 
including their perceived strengths and weaknesses, in making basic decisions, from 
evaluating settlement offers to assessing exposure to seeking Rule 54(b) certification, etc. 
Accordingly, appellees respectfully request the Court to render its opinion in this matter 
based upon the arguments raised and briefed by the parties throughout the case. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, plaintiffs/appellees submit that the language in 
Section 78-12-35 referenced in this Court's order of February 2,2009, does not limit its 
application to Section 78-14-4, and should not affect the outcome of this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Sfc^day of March, 2009. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
Roger P. Chrisfteiigen 
Karra J. Porter 
Attorneys for Appellees Arnold 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on the day of March, 2009, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING was mailed, first-class postage prepaid, to: 
Larry R. White 
950 Gateway Tower West 
15 West South Temple 
Salt Lake City UT 84101 
Attorneys for Appellee Grigsby 
Stephen W. Owens 
10 West 100 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City UT 84101 
Phillip R. Fishier 
Strong & Hanni 
3 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City UT 8 4180 
h0\A yi/iQ/l, 2X 
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Exhibit A 
Senate Bill 26 
House Floor Debate 
28 January 1967 
Debra A. Dibble; C.S.R., R.P-R-
witness * date 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE: Senate Bill No. 26. 
Statute of limitations reform by Lyle W. 
Hillyard (inaudible) legislature of the State of Utah. 
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE: Thank you. 
Senator Wilson. 
SENATOR WILSON: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. 
This bill deals with some uncertainty that 
presently exists in the Statute of Limitations section 
of the Utah law. 
What we have is different categories for 
certain actions (inaudible), and it limits the time in 
which one may bring a cause of action if it's in that 
particular category. 
They range from one year up to seven years, 
and eight years in the case of judgement. 
Presently, the Federal civil rights law 
actions are brought under the Utah Statute of 
Limitations because there is no Federal -- that that 
statute limitations (inaudible) case. And there's some 
confusion on which one of the categories this would fit 
in. 
For example, in the two-year limitation, 
itfs considered an assault on a police officer, but, in 
fact, an assault on a police officer may be a civil 
2 
witness * date 
rights action. 
Also, assault and battery is a one-year 
limitation in the (inaudible). 
Now, therefs a catch-all phrase in the 
four-year period that says any actions for which there 
has not been a specific time designated, they would fit 
into that. So the courts have generally put them in 
the four-year statute of limitations category. 
And what this does is clarify it by putting 
it in the two-year. 
It doesn't just (inaudible) a couple of 
other things. It changes the word insane to mentally 
incompetent, and it deals with the elimit --
elimination of imprisonment as being a period of time 
when the statute would not run. 
And typically, and historically, when one 
has been incarcerated, he does not have access to 
lawyers or information concerning his rights. 
As most of you will be aware of, that has 
(inaudible) being perhaps some of the best informed as 
to their legal rights are those who are incarcerated. 
And so it eliminates that as an exception, which would 
toll or stop the running of the statute of limitations. 
It does leave intact the one who is not of 
reached legal age, or one who is mentally incompetent, 
3 
witness * date 
1 and the statute o 
1 either become of 
1 reestablis 
1 causes of 
1 effective 
hed. 
f limitations would not run until they 
age or their competency is 
It does have an effect of applying only to 
action 
date of 
that are (inaudible) as of the 
the bill, so it does not interfere 
1 with anyone who may have a cause of action pending, 
1 those not actuall 
1 longer period of 
1 UP • 
1 waived. 
I'd be 
Those 
Seeing 
y filed yet, and may become along a 
appeal. 1 
happy to answer any questions. 1 
who wish to speak to the bill. 1 
none, Senator Wilson, prepare to sum 1 
SENATOR WILSON: I111 waive summation. 
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE: Summation has been 
Voting 
Voting 
Senate 
affirmative votes 
this house 
publically 
thereafter 
presence o 
• 
Before 
is open on Senate Bill 26. 1 
is closed on Senate Bill 26. 1 
Bill 26, having received 65 1 
and no negative votes, has passed 1 
the vote Senate Bill 26 was 1 
read by (inaudible) and immediately 1 
signed by the Speaker of the House in the 1 
f the House, over which he presides and the 1 
4 
witness * date 
(inaudible) 28th day of January, 1987. 
(Whereupon, the recording 
was concluded.) 
\18:11:00 
118:11:03 
* * * 
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Debra A. Dibble, Registered Professional 
Reporter for the State of Utah, do hereby certify that 
the foregoing transcript was taken down by me 
stenographically from electronically recorded tapes and 
thereafter transcribed under my direction. 
That the foregoing pages contain a true and 
accurate transcript of the electronically recorded 
proceedings, or requested portions thereof, and was 
transcribed by me to the best of my ability from the 
tapes given me. 
Debra A. Dibble, CSR, RPR 
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Exhibit B 
Senate Bill 26 
Senate Floor Debate 
16 January 1967 
* * * 
Debra A. Dibble; C.S.R., R.P.R. 
Senate Bill 26 * Senate Floor Debate * 16 January 1987 
PRESIDENT CHRISTENSEN: We'll move to our 
third reading calendar. Senate Bill 26. 
CLERK: Senate Bill No. 26, statute of 
limitations reform by Senator Hillyard. 
PRESIDENT CHRISTENSEN: Senator Hillyard? 
MR. HILLYARD: Thank you, Mr. President. 
We talked about this yesterday, and very 
briefly, it does three things. It does away with the 
tolling of the statute of limitations for someone in 
prison; 
and number two it redefines insanity to say 
it is tolled during mental incompetency; 
and number three, it clarifies the statute 
of limitations for civil rights actions under Section 
1983, and puts it clearly at two years. 
I'd be glad to respond to any questions you 
may have on that. 
PRESIDENT CHRISTENSEN: Senator Farley? 
SENATOR FARLEY: Mr. President, I have some 
concern over the -- the limitation of the statute. 
Limitation of the time on civil rights matters. 
And I am looking for the place in the bill 
so that I can amend that to -- to the four years. 
My motion is --
Do you -- do you know where the line is, 
2 
Senate Bill 26 * Senate Floor Debate * 16 January 1987 
1 Senat 
1 amend 
1 want 
1 langu 
19 — 
1 four. 
1 would 
1 line 
1 out -
1 on pa 
1 a --
that 
or Hillyard? 
I know it's not fair to ask you to help me 
your bill. 
PRESIDENT CHRISTENSEN: If that's what you 
to do, then you'd strictly move to bracket the 
age from the bill on page two, beginning on line 
excuse me, line 17, through page three, on line 
And the reason being, is that -- is you 
not obviously want to change the two years on 
19, for the other actions. You just want to take 
-
Or I guess the other thing you could bracket 
ge three, lines three and four, so we don't have 
a definition. 
You'd have to put it in the other section, 
talks about the four-year statute of limitations, 
rather than this section, which only talks about a 
1 two-y 
Senat 
bette 
lines 
ear. 
SENATOR FARLEY: So my motion would be, 
or Hillyard, to delete line 19. 1 
PRESIDENT CHRISTENSEN: No, I think the 
r way would be probably on page three, brackets 1 
three and four. 1 
SENATOR FARLEY: All right. I move to 
3 
Senate Bill 26 * Senate Floor Debate * 16 January 1987 
1 bracket on page three, lines three and four. Which 
1 will leave the -- the limitation to four years, rather 
1 than chan 
1 would ace 
1 is --
ging it to two. 
SENATOR HILLYARD: I think 
ept that it currently is four 
SENATOR FARLEY: -- the maj 
most attorneys 
, although there 
ority of people 
1 do not really understand what their civil rights are. 
1 And I think that two years is of -- is 
1 period. 
1 and I wou 
1 is where 
1 years. 
amendment 
responses 
not start 
a very brief 
The learning could occur later than that, 
Id prefer to see that at four 
we are now -- than to reduce 
I ask the body to consider 
years -- which 
that time to two 
that amendment. 
PRESIDENT CHRISTENSEN: Discussion to the 
9 
Senator Hillyard. 
SENATOR HILLYARD: I would 
to that. 
Number one, your statute of 
to run until you either know 
of your cause of action. 
I hate to bring in medical 
because that will get Senator Barlow's 
make just to 1 
limitations does 1 
or should know 1 
malpractice 1 
attention, but 1 
4 
Senate Bill 26 * Senate Floor Debate * 16 January 1987 
in a medical malpractice case, for example, if an 
instrument is left in your body and you don't know 
about it, then the statute of limitations doesn't run 
until you either know about that being left in your 
body or have good reason to know. 
The same thing with a civil rights 
violation. It may occur and you not know about it, the 
statute of limitations doesn't run until you know or 
should know. 
So that part of your concern, Senator 
Farley, I don't think is really meritorious for 
changing it. 
I think the other point about the policy 
consideration, I would just say this. 
Most intentional torts -- and that's where 
you know and you go out and hit somebody, or you do 
something like that, purposely, and that's what the 
civil rights violation has to be, is some kind of a --
it can't be mere negligence, is a shorter period than 
ordinary negligence. And that's where the definition 
came . 
My -- and I -- and I -- of course I guess 
people say it's strange for a lawyer to be shorting the 
period of limitations, but I think in this particular 
case, in civil rights, where it's -- if the -- it is 
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clearly a violation of the Federal Law, and number two, 
you can recover attorney fees if you can show a 
violation, and other (inaudible) can be brought, I 
think making it very clear that as a two-year statute 
is really a protection of everyone involved. 
There's -- and I say most attorneys would 
concede it's four years, but there's an argument it 
could only be one year, because there's a one-year 
statute of limitations on assault and battery. And I 
think we've clearly made it so that everyone knows, and 
put on notice, and two years is certainly a reasonable 
time to bring that when you know or should have known 
of the injury. 
PRESIDENT CHRISTENSEN: Senator Black? 
SENATOR BLACK: I'll yield to Senator 
Renstrom. 
SENATOR RENSTROM: Question. How are other 
states treating this? 
Are they doing -- going with one, two, four, 
six, or --
SENATOR HILLYARD: I'm not really aware of 
what other states have done, because other states have 
a different statute of limitations. For example, the 
time period, I know is shorter in -- in Idaho than it 
is in Utah for a negligence case. 
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And so I don't think what other states in 
particular have done may have been or not, other than 
our state should make a clear policy statement of two 
years, which, again, (inaudible) considerations, and I 
think I -- as a has lawyer said, there are separate 
issues on both sides. I think two years is a 
reasonable adjustment. 
PRESIDENT CHRISTENSEN: Further discussion 
of the amendment? 
Senator Farley? You'd like to sum up? 
SENATOR FARLEY: Well, I'd also like to ask 
a question. 
PRESIDENT CHRISTENSEN: Okay. 
SENATOR FARLEY: Of Senator Hillyard. 
What is the rush? I mean, what's -- what 
is the evidence that you have that indicates that this 
is a problem? If -- is it an MDR statement that --
that people should -- should know or should have 
known -- should have known is a pretty big loophole. 
People maybe should have known and don't know, but if 
they find out, it's too bad to have lost their rights. 
And we've been operating with a four-year --
substantially with a four-year period. What is it 
that -- that -- that has -- what's the problem that is 
so great that we have to limit people's rights to be 
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heard on civil rights infractions? 
SENATOR HILLYARD: The answer to that 
question is; number one, should have known as always 
been the standard. In my same medical malpractice 
case, that's always really been the law, is when you 
should have known. 
But number two, what's really brought this 
to a head is that there's been a lot of argument and 
debate back and forth. I think many lawyers thought, 
in Utah, it was one year, on assault and battery. 
If a police officer stopped a suspect it a 
scene of a crime and there was a -- acute beating, 
then -- that pretty well concede it's one year,and then 
the two-year on the false arrest. 
But there was a very recent, within the last 
couple of years, the Supreme -- or Tenth Circuit 
decision that through that all in a mess and said, no, 
it's really four years, even though it's not a 
negligence. 
And I know I filed a bill, last session, to 
do this, and near the end of the session when the 
Supreme Court decision came down, and we were just 
caught in the crunch and didn't have a chance to look 
at it. 
We did look at it during the judiciary, and 
8 
Senate Bill 26 * Senate Floor Debate * 16 January 1987 
1 during 
1 issues 
1 period, 
1 to the 
1 rights 
1 prison, 
1 within 
the interim, and again, there were some other 
involved in it, of a statute of limitations 
and they felt that this one needs to be clearly 
fore, because of the proliferation of the civil 
actions that are being filed, especially in our 
and secondly in the light of the Tenth Circuit 
the last year or two. 
SENATOR FARLEY: I'm willing to summarize 
1 now, Mr. President. 
It seems to me that without knowing what's 
1 happening in other states, without knowing what the 
1 consensus is around the country on what is an 
1 appropriate period for civil rights violations, and 
1 because we've been managing fairly well without any 1 
1 obvious difficulties, that -- that there's nothing that 1 
1 sounds to me as if it's caused a great deal of trouble, 1 
1 it appears to me that we ought to come down on the side 1 
1 of the people, and allow them to have the four years in 1 
1 which to -- to determine that they -- that their civil 1 
1 rights 
that I 
have been violated. 1 
I -- I ask you to vote for the amendment 1 
have proposed. 1 
Thank you. 1 
PRESIDENT CHRISTENSEN: My question on the 
amendment. Those in favor the amendment say aye. 1 
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(Ayes heard.) 
Opposed, no? 
(Nos heard.) 
Amendment fails. 
SENATOR FARLEY: I'd like to have a -- a 
roll call on that motion. 
PRESIDENT CHRISTENSEN: Roll call is 
requested. 
SENATOR FARLEY: Well, standing vote would 
be fine. 
PRESIDENT CHRISTENSEN: Standing vote. 
Those in favor stand. 
One, two, three, four, five, six, seven, 
eight, nine. 
Opposed? 
One, two, three, four, five, six, seven, 
eight, nine, ten, eleven, 12, 13, 14. 
The vote was properly tabulated. 
Further discussion on the bill? 
SENATOR HILLYARD: Seeing that, 
Mr. President, I'd call for a passage of -- that Senate 
Bill 26 be considered for the last third for final 
passage. 
PRESIDENT CHRISTENSEN: The question has 
been called for. 
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1 The question is, shall Senate Bill 26 pass? 
1 CLERK: Senator Bangerter? 
1 SENATOR BANGERTER: (Inaudible response.) 
CLERK: Barlow? 
1 SENATOR: (Inaudible response.) 
CLERK: Barton? 
1 SENATOR: (Inaudible response.) 
CLERK: Black? 
1 SENATOR: (Inaudible response.) 1 
CLERK: Bunnell? 
1 SENATOR: (Inaudible response.) 
CLERK: Carling? 
1 SENATOR: (Inaudible response.) 
CLERK: Cornaby? 
J SENATOR: (Inaudible response.) 1 
CLERK: Farley? 
1 SENATOR: (Inaudible response.) 1 
CLERK: Finlinson. 1 
SENATOR: (Inaudible response.) 1 
CLERK: Fordham -- 1 
SENATOR: (Inaudible response.) 1 
CLERK: Hillyard? 
SENATOR: (Inaudible response.) 1 
CLERK: Holmgren? J 
SENATOR: (Inaudible response.) 1 
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] SENATOR i (Inaudible response . ) 
2 CLERK: Steele? 
3 SENATOR: (Inaudible response.) 
I CLERK: 
5 SENATOR: (Inaudible response.) 
6 CLERK: Tempest. 
7 SENATOR ...;_!_• _ ^ -
8 1 CLERK: F a r l e y ? 
9 1 Sh'.J.n .
 L Die r e s p o n s e . ) 
] 0 CLERK, -• . ' h m s t e n s e n ? 
] ] I S EN AT 01 n a u d i £> 1 e r e s p o n s e . ) 
] 2 P R E S ^ i • . r * - ' P : 1 . shows 
1 3 I 25 ayes, two ayes; > v nays; *w absents. It ::,a. -
] 4 I pass dini IM> I i- f i- r r ^ d t- o the House for their further 
15 1 action. 
16 Is that it? 
17 1 (Wher enp''ii, 'he recording 
18 I was concluded,) 
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